When President Vladimir Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, he was defiantly marking the first anniversary of his country’s war in Ukraine. The treaty, known as NewSTART, was the last remaining nuclear arms control pact between Moscow and Washington, D.C., which hold 90 % of the world’s nuclear arms together.
Preceding Putin’s announcement and referring to the Ukraine conflict, he said that the U.S. and NATO wanted “to inflict a strategic defeat on us,” and get to our nuclear facilities. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken called Russia’s decision “deeply unfortunate and irresponsible” and added that on arms control, the U.S. would engage with Russia at any time, “irrespective of anything else going on in the world or in our relationship.”
This is what had happened in the past – continuing engagement and negotiations between the two superpowers, even during the height of the Cold War.
Putin’s suspension, however, is not withdrawal, and his foreign ministry did say that it would observe the limits on warheads mandated by the NewSTART, and they would continue notifying Washington of planned test launches of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). NATO’s Secretary-General said that “With today’s decision on NewSTART, full arms control architecture has been dismantled.’
What this means is that there are no formal arrangements for on-site inspections to verify compliance with the NewSTART’s limits – 1,550 nuclear warheads, 700 deployed ICBMs, and 800 launches and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear arsenals. No longer will there be transparency into each other’s nuclear forces.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine War had halted mutual inspections and negotiations, and Russia had already refused to participate in the treaty’s Bi-lateral Consultative Commission Meetings. In reality, NewSTART was already in jeopardy amid mounting tensions and distrust as each side had claimed noncompliance and violation of the treaty by the other.
Now, following Russia’s suspension, the fear is that it will adversely affect arms control architecture and non-proliferation, especially in view of developments in North Korea and Iran.
It is useful to recall the history of bilateral negotiations and pacts: The NewSTART is a successor to multiple treaties between these countries to control each other’s nuclear arsenals. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) under former President Richard Nixon in 1969 were followed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Treaty, signed in 1972, which the George W. Bush administration scuttled in 2002.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), in force between 1991 and 2009, was followed by the Moscow Treaty, signed in 2002. The Trump administration withdrew from two other treaties – the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty. The NewSTART Treaty went into force in February 2011 during the Obama administration and was extended by Presidents Biden and Putin to 2026.
It is equally worth recalling that under the landmark 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the five nuclear weapons states – US, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom – undertook “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
Never have the five negotiated in good faith, despite the commitment they made. Promise made and promise broken.
There has been no serious effort to eliminate nuclear weapons, although in July 2017 the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, banning the development, acquisition, test, use, threat of use, and possession of nuclear weapons. With currently 68 state parties and 92 signatories, and no nuclear weapons state voting in favor, it will have no real influence on the abolition of nuclear weapons.
Several civil society groups, including Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, on whose advisory board I serve, have forcefully advocated for abolishing nuclear weapons. The goal, which at present seems illusory, must eventually be reached.
Ved Nanda is a Distinguished University Professor and director of the Ved Nanda Center for International Law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. His column appears on the last Sunday of each month, and he welcomes comments at vnanda@law.du.edu.
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